- 1 10-2-1. Offshore Helicopter Operations
- 1.1 b. Passenger Management on and about Heliport Facilities
- 1.2 c. Crane-Helicopter Operational Procedures
- 1.3 d. Helicopter/Tanker Operations
- 1.4 e. Helideck/Heliport Operational Hazard Warning(s) Procedures
- 1.5 f. Drilling Rig Perforating Operations: Helideck/Heliport Operational Hazard Warning(s)/Procedure(s)
- 1.6 g. Hydrogen Sulfide Gas Helideck/Heliport Operational Hazard Warning(s)/Procedures
- 1.7 h. Gas Venting Helideck/Heliport Operational Hazard Warning(s)/Procedures - Operations Near Gas Vent Booms
- 1.8 i. Helideck/Heliport Operational Warning(s)/Procedure(s) - Closed Helidecks or Heliports
- 1.9 j. Offshore (VFR) Operating Altitudes for Helicopters
10-2-1. Offshore Helicopter Operations
The offshore environment offers unique applications and challenges for helicopter pilots. The mission demands, the nature of oil and gas exploration and production facilities, and the flight environment (weather, terrain, obstacles, traffic), demand special practices, techniques and procedures not found in other flight operations. Several industry organizations have risen to the task of reducing risks in offshore operations, including the Helicopter Safety Advisory Conference (HSAC) (http://www.hsac.org), and the Offshore Committee of the Helicopter Association International (HAI) (http://www.rotor.com). The following recommended practices for offshore helicopter operations are based on guidance developed by HSAC for use in the Gulf of Mexico, and provided here with their permission. While not regulatory, these recommended practices provide aviation and oil and gas industry operators with useful information in developing procedures to avoid certain hazards of offshore helicopter operations.
Like all aviation practices, these recommended practices are under constant review. In addition to normal procedures for comments, suggested changes, or corrections to the AIM (contained in the Preface), any questions or feedback concerning these recommended procedures may also be directed to the HSAC through the feedback feature of the HSAC web site (http://www.hsac.org).
b. Passenger Management on and about Heliport Facilities
1. Background. Several incidents involving offshore helicopter passengers have highlighted the potential for incidents and accidents on and about the heliport area. The following practices will minimize risks to passengers and others involved in heliport operations.
2. Recommended Practices
(a) Heliport facilities should have a designated and posted passenger waiting area which is clear of the heliport, heliport access points, and stairways.
(b) Arriving passengers and cargo should be unloaded and cleared from the heliport and access route prior to loading departing passengers and cargo.
(c) Where a flight crew consists of more than one pilot, one crewmember should supervise the unloading/loading process from outside the aircraft.
(d) Where practical, a designated facility employee should assist with loading/unloading, etc.
c. Crane-Helicopter Operational Procedures
1. Background. Historical experience has shown that catastrophic consequences can occur when industry safe practices for crane/helicopter operations are not observed. The following recommended practices are designed to minimize risks during crane and helicopter operations.
2. Recommended Practices
(a) Personnel awareness
(1) Crane operators and pilots should develop a mutual understanding and respect of the others' operational limitations and cooperate in the spirit of safety;
(2) Pilots need to be aware that crane operators sometimes cannot release the load to cradle the crane boom, such as when attached to wire line lubricators or supporting diving bells; and
(3) Crane operators need to be aware that helicopters require warm up before takeoff, a two-minute cool down before shutdown, and cannot circle for extended lengths of time because of fuel consumption.
(b) It is recommended that when helicopters are approaching, maneuvering, taking off, or running on the heliport, cranes be shutdown and the operator leave the cab. Cranes not in use shall have their booms cradled, if feasible. If in use, the crane's boom(s) are to be pointed away from the heliport and the crane shutdown for helicopter operations.
(c) Pilots will not approach, land on, takeoff, or have rotor blades turning on heliports of structures not complying with the above practice.
(d) It is recommended that cranes on offshore platforms, rigs, vessels, or any other facility, which could interfere with helicopter operations (including approach/departure paths):
(1) Be equipped with a red rotating beacon or red high intensity strobe light connected to the system powering the crane, indicating the crane is under power;
(2) Be designed to allow the operator a maximum view of the helideck area and should be equipped with wide-angle mirrors to eliminate blind spots; and
(3) Have their boom tips, headache balls, and hooks painted with high visibility international orange.
d. Helicopter/Tanker Operations
1. Background. The interface of helicopters and tankers during shipboard helicopter operations is complex and may be hazardous unless appropriate procedures are coordinated among all parties. The following recommended practices are designed to minimize risks during helicopter/tanker operations:
2. Recommended Practices
(a) Management, flight operations personnel, and pilots should be familiar with and apply the operating safety standards set forth in “Guide to Helicopter/Ship Operations”, International Chamber of Shipping, Third Edition, 5-89 (as amended), establishing operational guidelines/standards and safe practices sufficient to safeguard helicopter/tanker operations.
(b) Appropriate plans, approvals, and communications must be accomplished prior to reaching the vessel, allowing tanker crews sufficient time to perform required safety preparations and position crew members to receive or dispatch a helicopter safely.
(c) Appropriate approvals and direct communications with the bridge of the tanker must be maintained throughout all helicopter/tanker operations.
(d) Helicopter/tanker operations, including landings/departures, shall not be conducted until the helicopter pilot-in-command has received and acknowledged permission from the bridge of the tanker.
(e) Helicopter/tanker operations shall not be conducted during product/cargo transfer.
(f) Generally, permission will not be granted to land on tankers during mooring operations or while maneuvering alongside another tanker.
e. Helideck/Heliport Operational Hazard Warning(s) Procedures
(a) A number of operational hazards can develop on or near offshore helidecks or onshore heliports that can be minimized through procedures for proper notification or visual warning to pilots. Examples of hazards include but are not limited to:
(1) Perforating operations: subparagraph f.
(2) H2S gas presence: subparagraph g.
(3) Gas venting: subparagraph h; or,
(4) Closed helidecks or heliports: sub-paragraph i (unspecified cause).
(b) These and other operational hazards are currently minimized through timely dissemination of a written Notice to Airmen (NOTAM) for pilots by helicopter companies and operators. A NOTAM provides a written description of the hazard, time and duration of occurrence, and other pertinent information. ANY POTENTIAL HAZARD should be communicated to helicopter operators or company aviation departments as early as possible to allow the NOTAM to be activated.
(c) To supplement the existing NOTAM procedure and further assist in reducing these hazards, a standardized visual signal(s) on the helideck/heliport will provide a positive indication to an approaching helicopter of the status of the landing area. Recommended Practice(s) have been developed to reinforce the NOTAM procedures and standardize visual signals.
f. Drilling Rig Perforating Operations: Helideck/Heliport Operational Hazard Warning(s)/Procedure(s)
1. Background. A critical step in the oil well completion process is perforation, which involves the use of explosive charges in the drill pipe to open the pipe to oil or gas deposits. Explosive charges used in conjunction with perforation operations offshore can potentially be prematurely detonated by radio transmissions, including those from helicopters. The following practices are recommended.
2. Recommended Practices
(a) Personnel Conducting Perforating Operations. Whenever perforating operations are scheduled and operators are concerned that radio transmissions from helicopters in the vicinity may jeopardize the operation, personnel conducting perforating operations should take the following precautionary measures:
(1) Notify company aviation departments, helicopter operators or bases, and nearby manned platforms of the pending perforation operation so the Notice to Airmen (NOTAM) system can be activated for the perforation operation and the temporary helideck closure.
(2) Close the deck and make the radio warning clearly visible to passing pilots, install a temporary marking (described in subparagraph 10-2-1i1(b)) with the words “NO RADIO” stenciled in red on the legs of the diagonals. The letters should be 24 inches high and 12 inches wide. (See FIG 10-2-1.)
(3) The marker should be installed during the time that charges may be affected by radio transmissions.
(1) Pilots when operating within 1,000 feet of a known perforation operation or observing the white X with red “NO RADIO” warning indicating perforation operations are underway will avoid radio transmissions from or near the helideck (within 1,000 feet) and will not land on the deck if the X is present. In addition to communications radios, radio transmissions are also emitted by aircraft radar, transponders, radar altimeters, and DME equipment, and ELTs.
(2) Whenever possible, make radio calls to the platform being approached or to the Flight Following Communications Center at least one mile out on approach. Ensure all communications are complete outside the 1,000 foot hazard distance. If no response is received, or if the platform is not radio equipped, further radio transmissions should not be made until visual contact with the deck indicates it is open for operation (no white “X”).
g. Hydrogen Sulfide Gas Helideck/Heliport Operational Hazard Warning(s)/Procedures
1. Background. Hydrogen sulfide (H2S) gas: Hydrogen sulfide gas in higher concentrations (300-500 ppm) can cause loss of consciousness within a few seconds and presents a hazard to pilots on/near offshore helidecks. When operating in offshore areas that have been identified to have concentrations of hydrogen sulfide gas, the following practices are recommended.
2. Recommended Practices
(1) Ensure approved protective air packs are available for emergency use by the crew on the helicopter.
(2) If shutdown on a helideck, request the supervisor in charge provide a briefing on location of protective equipment and safety procedures.
(3) If while flying near a helideck and the visual red beacon alarm is observed or an unusually strong odor of “rotten eggs” is detected, immediately don the protective air pack, exit to an area upwind, and notify the suspected source field of the hazard.
(b) Oil Field Supervisors
(1) If presence of hydrogen sulfide is detected, a red rotating beacon or red high intensity strobe light adjacent to the primary helideck stairwell or wind indicator on the structure should be turned on to provide visual warning of hazard. If the beacon is to be located near the stairwell, the State of Louisiana “Offshore Heliport Design Guide” and FAA Advisory Circular AC 150/5390-2A, “Heliport Design Guide,” should be reviewed to ensure proper clearance on the helideck.
(2) Notify nearby helicopter operators and bases of the hazard and advise when hazard is cleared.
(3) Provide a safety briefing to include location of protective equipment to all arriving personnel.
(4) Wind socks or indicator should be clearly visible to provide upwind indication for the pilot.
h. Gas Venting Helideck/Heliport Operational Hazard Warning(s)/Procedures - Operations Near Gas Vent Booms
1. Background. Ignited flare booms can release a large volume of natural gas and create a hot fire and intense heat with little time for the pilot to react. Likewise, unignited gas vents can release reasonably large volumes of methane gas under certain conditions. Thus, operations conducted very near unignited gas vents require precautions to prevent inadvertent ingestion of combustible gases by the helicopter engine(s). The following practices are recommended.
(a) Gas will drift upwards and downwind of the vent. Plan the approach and takeoff to observe and avoid the area downwind of the vent, remaining as far away as practicable from the open end of the vent boom.
(b) Do not attempt to start or land on an offshore helideck when the deck is downwind of a gas vent unless properly trained personnel verify conditions are safe.
3. Oil Field Supervisors
(a) During venting of large amounts of unignited raw gas, a red rotating beacon or red high intensity strobe light adjacent to the primary helideck stairwell or wind indicator should be turned on to provide visible warning of hazard. If the beacon is to be located near the stairwell, the State of Louisiana “Offshore Heliport Design Guide” and FAA Advisory Circular AC 150/5390-2A, Heliport Design Guide, should be reviewed to ensure proper clearance from the helideck.
(b) Notify nearby helicopter operators and bases of the hazard for planned operations.
(c) Wind socks or indicator should be clearly visible to provide upward indication for the pilot.
i. Helideck/Heliport Operational Warning(s)/Procedure(s) - Closed Helidecks or Heliports
1. Background. A white “X” marked diagonally from corner to corner across a helideck or heliport touchdown area is the universally accepted visual indicator that the landing area is closed for safety of other reasons and that helicopter operations are not permitted. The following practices are recommended.
(a) Permanent Closing. If a helideck or heliport is to be permanently closed, X diagonals of the same size and location as indicated above should be used, but the markings should be painted on the landing area.
White Decks: If a helideck is painted white, then international orange or yellow markings can be used for the temporary or permanent diagonals.
(b) Temporary Closing. A temporary marker can be used for hazards of an interim nature. This marker could be made from vinyl or other durable material in the shape of a diagonal “X.” The marker should be white with legs at least 20 feet long and 3 feet in width. This marker is designed to be quickly secured and removed from the deck using grommets and rope ties. The duration, time, location, and nature of these temporary closings should be provided to and coordinated with company aviation departments, nearby helicopter bases, and helicopter operators supporting the area. These markers MUST be removed when the hazard no longer exists. (See FIG 10-2-2.)
j. Offshore (VFR) Operating Altitudes for Helicopters
1. Background. Mid-air collisions constitute a significant percentage of total fatal offshore helicopter accidents. A method of reducing this risk is the use of coordinated VFR cruising altitudes. To enhance safety through standardized vertical separation of helicopters when flying in the offshore environment, it is recommended that helicopter operators flying in a particular area establish a cooperatively developed Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) for VFR operating altitudes. An example of such an SOP is contained in this example.
|0° to 179°||750'|
2. Recommended Practice Example
(a) Field Operations. Without compromising minimum safe operating altitudes, helicopters working within an offshore field “constituting a cluster” should use altitudes not to exceed 500 feet.
(b) En Route Operations
(1) Helicopters operating below 750' AGL should avoid transitioning through offshore fields.
(2) Helicopters en route to and from offshore locations, below 3,000 feet, weather permitting, should use en route altitudes as outlined in TBL 10-2-1.
(c) Area Agreements. See HSAC Area Agreement Maps for operating procedures for onshore high density traffic locations.
NOTE- Pilots of helicopters operating VFR above 3,000 feet above the surface should refer to the current Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR Part 91), and paragraph 3-1-4, Basic VFR Weather Minimums, of the AIM.
(d) Landing Lights. Aircraft landing lights should be on to enhance aircraft identification:
(1) During takeoff and landings;
(2) In congested helicopter or fixed wing traffic areas;
(3) During reduced visibility; or,
(4) Anytime safety could be enhanced.
k. Offshore Helidecks/Landing Communications
1. Background. To enhance safety, and provide appropriate time to prepare for helicopter operations, the following is recommended when anticipating a landing on an offshore helideck.
2. Recommended Practices
(a) Before landing on an offshore helideck, pilots are encouraged to establish communications with the company owning or operating the helideck if frequencies exist for that purpose.
(b) When impracticable, or if frequencies do not exist, pilots or operations personnel should attempt to contact the company owning or operating the helideck by telephone. Contact should be made before the pilot departs home base/point of departure to advise of intentions and obtain landing permission if necessary.
NOTE- It is recommended that communications be established a minimum of 10 minutes prior to planned arrival time. This practice may be a requirement of some offshore owner/operators.
NOTE- 1. See subparagraph 10-2-1d for Tanker Operations.
2. Private use Heliport. Offshore heliports are privately owned/operated facilities and their use is limited to persons having prior authorization to utilize the facility.
l. Two (2) Helicopter Operations on Offshore Helidecks
1. Background. Standardized procedures can enhance the safety of operating a second helicopter on an offshore helideck, enabling pilots to determine/maintain minimum operational parameters. Orientation of the parked helicopter on the helideck, wind and other factors may prohibit multi-helicopter operations. More conservative Rotor Diameter (RD) clearances may be required under differing condition, i.e., temperature, wet deck, wind (velocity/direction/gusts), obstacles, approach/departure angles, etc. Operations are at the pilot's discretion.
2. Recommended Practice. Helideck size, structural weight capability, and type of main rotor on the parked and operating helicopter will aid in determining accessibility by a second helicopter. Pilots should determine that multi-helicopter deck operations are permitted by the helideck owner/operator.
3. Recommended Criteria
(a) Minimum one-third rotor diameter clearance (1/3 RD). The landing helicopter maintains a minimum 1/3 RD clearance between the tips of its turning rotor and the closest part of a parked and secured helicopter (rotors stopped and tied down).
(b) Three foot parking distance from deck edge (3'). Helicopters operating on an offshore helideck land or park the helicopter with a skid/wheel assembly no closer than 3 feet from helideck edge.
(c) Tiedowns. Main rotors on all helicopters that are shut down be properly secured (tied down) to prevent the rotor blades from turning.
(d) Medium (transport) and larger helicopters should not land on any offshore helideck where a light helicopter is parked unless the light helicopter is property secured to the helideck and has main rotor tied down.
(e) Helideck owners/operators should ensure that the helideck has a serviceable anti-skid surface.
4. Weight and limitations markings on helideck. The helideck weight limitations should be displayed by markings visible to the pilot (see State of Louisiana “Offshore Heliport Design Guide” and FAA Advisory Circular AC 150/5390-2A, Heliport Design Guide).
NOTE- Some offshore helideck owners/operators have restrictions on the number of helicopters allowed on a helideck. When helideck size permits, multiple (more than two) helicopter operations are permitted by some operators.
m. Helicopter Rapid Refueling Procedures (HRR)
1. Background. Helicopter Rapid Refueling (HRR), engine(s)/rotors operating, can be conducted safely when utilizing trained personnel and observing safe practices. This recommended practice provides minimum guidance for HRR as outlined in National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) and industry practices. For detailed guidance, please refer to National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) Document 407, “Standard for Aircraft Fuel Servicing,” 1990 edition, including 1993 HRR Amendment.
NOTE- Certain operators prohibit HRR, or “hot refueling,” or may have specific procedures for certain aircraft or refueling locations. See the General Operations Manual and/or Operations Specifications to determine the applicable procedures or limitations.
2. Recommended Practices
(a) Only turbine-engine helicopters fueled with JET A or JET A-1 with fueling ports located below any engine exhausts may be fueled while an onboard engine(s) is (are) operating.
(b) Helicopter fueling while an onboard engine(s) is (are) operating should only be conducted under the following conditions:
(1) A properly certificated and current pilot is at the controls and a trained refueler attending the fuel nozzle during the entire fuel servicing process. The pilot monitors the fuel quantity and signals the refueler when quantity is reached.
(2) No electrical storms (thunderstorms) are present within 10 nautical miles. Lightning can travel great distances beyond the actual thunderstorm.
(3) Passengers disembark the helicopter and move to a safe location prior to HRR operations. When the pilot-in-command deems it necessary for passenger safety that they remain onboard, passengers should be briefed on the evacuation route to follow to clear the area.
(4) Passengers not board or disembark during HRR operations nor should cargo be loaded or unloaded.
(5) Only designated personnel, trained in HRR operations should conduct HRR written authorization to include safe handling of the fuel and equipment. (See your Company Operations/Safety Manual for detailed instructions.)
(6) All doors, windows, and access points allowing entry to the interior of the helicopter that are adjacent to or in the immediate vicinity of the fuel inlet ports kept closed during HRR operations.
(7) Pilots insure that appropriate electrical/electronic equipment is placed in standby-off position, to preclude the possibility of electrical discharge or other fire hazard, such as [i.e., weather radar is on standby and no radio transmissions are made (keying of the microphone/transmitter)]. Remember, in addition to communications radios, radio transmissions are also emitted by aircraft radar, transponders, radar altimeters, DME equipment, and ELTs.
(8) Smoking be prohibited in and around the helicopter during all HRR operations.
The HRR procedures are critical and present associated hazards requiring attention to detail regarding quality control, weather conditions, static electricity, bonding, and spill/fires potential.
Any activity associated with rotors turning (i.e.; refueling embarking/disembarking, loading/unloading baggage/freight; etc.) personnel should only approach the aircraft when authorized to do so. Approach should be made via safe approach path/walkway or “arc”- remain clear of all rotors.
1. Marine vessels, barges etc.: Vessel motion presents additional potential hazards to helicopter operations (blade flex, aircraft movement).
2. See National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) Document 407, “Standard for Aircraft Fuel Servicing” for specifics regarding non-HRR (routine refueling operations).
|Aeronautical Information Manual (AIM) — Chapter 10|
|10-1-1 - 10-1-2 - 10-1-3 - 10-1-4 - 10-2-1 - 10-2-2 - 10-2-3 - 10-2-4|